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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A088 425 888
Immigration Judge:  Dorothy Harbeck
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 9, 2010
Before:   FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges





Yoon Pin Yap has filed a petition for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ”) final removal order.  We will deny the petition for review.
      On appeal, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Yap’s asylum application was untimely,1
and Yap concedes in his brief here that we lack jurisdiction to consider the issue further.
2
Yap is a native and citizen of Malaysia.  He is of Chinese ethnicity and practices
the Buddhist religion.  He came to the United States on a visitor’s visa but stayed longer
than permitted.  He applied for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The IJ found that his asylum application was
untimely,  but considered his eligibility for other relief.  The IJ found that Yap was not1
credible, that he failed to provide adequate corroboration of his claims, and that he failed
to meet his burden of showing eligibility for withholding of removal and protection under
the CAT.
The BIA agreed with the IJ’s “ultimate conclusion that, even if credible, [Yap]
failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum and withholding of removal.”  A.R. 3.  The
BIA found that Yap’s testimony that he was discriminated against at school by teachers
and students, and that he was stopped by police and forced to pay bribes for supposed
traffic violations, did not rise to the level of past persecution.  The BIA also found that
asylum eligibility was not established by the evidence Yap submitted of country
conditions.  The BIA agreed that Yap had failed to provide reasonably available
corroboration of his claims, such as written statements from family members.  The BIA
also noted that the record did “not indicate that it is more likely than not that [Yap] will
face torture by or with the acquiescence (to include the concept of willful blindness) of a
3
member of the government of Malaysia upon return to Malaysia.”  A.R. 4.  Yap filed a
timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision.
We have jurisdiction over this petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  Where,
as here, the BIA adopted some of the findings of the IJ and made additional findings, we
review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ.  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen.,  527 F.3d
330, 339 (3d Cir. 2008).  To be eligible for withholding of removal, Yap must
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that his life would be threatened in Malaysia on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.  Tarrawally, 338 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  We
may reverse the BIA’s decision only if the record would compel a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that the requisite fear existed. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992).
The record does not compel the conclusion that the incidents Yap recounted (being
punched once, having to pay bribes for traffic incidents) rise to the level of “persecution.” 
See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (defining persecution as “threats to
life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat
to life or freedom,” and explaining that persecution “does not encompass all treatment
that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or unconstitutional”); Wong v.
Att’y Gen., 539 F. 3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (observing that “harassment and
discrimination do not constitute persecution”); Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir.
      Both the IJ and BIA denied Yap's claims in part because of lack of corroboration. 2
However, even if the incidents Yap recounted had been corroborated, they would not
support a finding of past persecution.
      Although Yap states that the BIA erred in denying his CAT claim, he does not point3
to any evidence in the record indicating that it is more likely than not that he would be
tortured if he were to return to Malaysia.  We thus will deny the petition for review of the
denial of his claim for protection under the CAT.
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2005) (holding that “two isolated criminal acts, perpetrated by unknown assailants, . . .
[are] not sufficiently severe to be considered persecution”).   We further agree with the2
BIA that the record does not reflect that country conditions are such that it is more likely
than not that Yap would face future persecution in Malaysia on account of his ethnicity or
religion.
Yap submitted evidence that his mother and his sister were both victims of
robbery, and that his cousin was tragically beaten to death in a robbery.  These incidents
are very troubling, but we agree with the IJ that Yap did not show that his relatives were
robbed because of any protected ground, as opposed to simply being victims of crime. 
Further, Yap did not allege that he was in danger of persecution because of his family
membership.  We thus find that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Yap
did not meet his burden of establishing eligibility for withholding of removal.3
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
